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Abstract
Using a firm-level  survey database covering  48 countries,  determinant of whether firms can  have access to different
Beck,  Demirgiuc-Kunt,  and Maksimovic  investigate  types of external  finance.  Larger  firms with financing
whether differences  in financial  and legal  development  needs are more likely  to use external  finance compared
affect  the way firms finance  their investments. The  with small firms.  The results also indicate that these firms
results indicate  that external  financing of investments is  are more likely to use external finance  in more
not a function of institutions,  although the form of  developed  financial systems,  particularly debt and equity
external  finance  is. The authors identify  two  finance.  The authors also find evidence  consistent with
explanations  for this.  First, legal  and financial  the pecking order theory  in financially  developed
institutions  affect different  types of external finance in  countries,  particularly for large firms.
offsetting ways. Second,  firm size  is an important
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Both the theoretical and the empirical literature in corporate finance demonstrate
that financial market imperfections  constrain the availability of external financing.
Cross-country comparisons have shown that access to external financing  is shaped by the
country's legal and financial environment (La  Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and
Vishny (LLSV),  1997,  1998; Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic,  1996,  1998, 1999;  Booth
et al 2001, Rajan and Zingales,  1995,  1998, Wurgler 2001).'  Studies show that in
countries with weak legal systems, and consequently weak financial systems firms obtain
less external financing, in particular less term financing,  so that their growth and
investment efficiency are reduced.
In this paper we ask whether the strong relation between external financing and
country's financial and legal institutions in the literature holds when we consider a
broader spectrum of external financing sources and our more representative  sample of
firms How do the country's institutions affect whether a firm uses a specific type of
external financing, and if so, how much it uses? Do the results for large firms carry over
to small firms?  Is the cross-country evidence consistent with pecking order of financing
sources, so that equity financing is consistently "costlier" even in countries with
developed institutions?
While the firm-level empirical results in the existing literature  are plausible and
consistent with corporate  finance theory, the relatively narrow evidence on which they
' Carlin and Mayer (1998) argue that there exists  a relation between a country's  financial system and the
characteristics of industries that prosper in the country. The importance of institutional development for
investment is demonstrated  by Wurgler (2000) and Love (2000), who show that the flow of capital to good
investment projects increases with financial development.  At the macro level, King and Levine (1993),
Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) show that financial development promotes
growth and that differences in legal origins explain differences in financial development.
3are based often does not support the general inferences that seem to follow naturally from
the results. Due to data limitations, the studies compare the largest, and perhaps
unrepresentative,  firms across countries.  The definitions of external  financing used focus
on equity and external debt, and do not take into account the possibility that in some
countries finns may substitute other forms of financing.  Although these studies
investigate access to external capital, they do not model the firm-level self-selection that
occurs when access to a particular source of financing differs across countries.
We address these issues using a new data source, the World Business
Environment Survey (WBES), a major cross-sectional firm level survey conducted in
developed and developing countries in  1999 and led by the World Bank.  One of the
important strengths of the survey is its coverage of small and medium enterprises; eighty
percent of the observations are from small and medium firms.  Firms in the sample
directly report on financing obstacles they face.
Our results show that, with a more representative  sample of firms in each country
and a more inclusive definition of external finance, the proportion of investment financed
externally by firms cannot be explained by the substantial differences  we observe in the
legal systems and financial institutions across  countries.  Firms in less developed
systems substitute alternative forms of extemal financing for those used more prevalently
in developed countries:  Thus, for equity and bank loans they substitute trade credit and
what we term "other" or residual sources of financing, that is funding from miscellaneous
sources such as the government, development banks and informal sources.
Financial and legal institutions do significantly affect the type of external
financing that firms obtain. Consistent with the earlier literature,  such as LLSV (1997)
4and Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998)  on large firms, firms in common law.
countries have greater access to bank and equity finance.  These firms also use a lower
proportion of suppliers'  credit and residual sources to finance their investment. Firms in
countries with better-developed banking systems  are less likely to use equity finance.
Developed legal  systems increase the proportion of  bank finance and lower the
proportion of residual financing from other sources in the financing mix of firms.  We
also see that these other sources and trade credit play a larger role in the financing of
investment in countries with less developed institutions. Thus, part of the reason why we
do not see a positive relationship between institutional  development and external finance
is because institutions  affect different  sources of finance differently.
Our results also suggest that firms in less developed financial systems and in civil
law countries substitute  less efficient forms of extemal finance,  trade credit and other
sources of funds, for bank loans and equity.  This is consistent with the findings in the
earlier literature that firms in such countries use less long-term external finance and
appear to grow more slowly.
Using firms' reports of financing obstacles,  we find that for most firms access to
external financing is costly: firms are either shut out of the market for external  financing
or there is a positive relation between the use of external finance and the financing
obstacles firms face. However, institutions have an important role to play in this relation.
Indeed, firms that report higher financing obstacles are less likely to be self-financed and
more likely to use external finance in more developed financial systems.  Again, we see
differences based on the type of financing and the size of the firm that needs it.  Large
firms use bank and equity finance despite evidence  that it is costly.  Smaller firms find it
5more difficult to access the financial  system to obtain debt and equity for all levels of
institutional  development.
Finally, we examine whether a hierarchy or pecking order of financing sources
exists in different institutional settings and for different firm sizes.  Myers and Majluf
(1984) argue that financial market imperfections  make it costly for firms to obtain
external financing.  Consistent with pecking order theory, we find evidence that equity
financing is costlier than debt financing for large firms and finms in financially developed
countries. We obtain more ambiguous results for small firms and firms in less developed
countries, but the evidence  is consistent with these firms having little access to equity
markets. Overall, the predictions of the Myers and Majluf pecking order seem to hold up
well for larger firms with access to well developed financial institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss the
motivation for the analysis. Section 3 discusses the data and summary statistics.  Section
4 discusses the empirical methodology.  Section 5 presents our main results. Section 6
has conclusions and policy implications.
2.  Motivation and Methodology
Existing studies of firm financing have several important limitations.  First, they
are based on linear statistical models that do not allow for firms in different countries to
have a pecking order of financing preferences.  Second, they define extemal financing
narrowly. Third, the firms examined are some of the largest firms in country,  so that the
results may not be representative  of their economies.
6The empirical specifications  in the papers on firm-level financing assume a linear
model.  Thus, countrywide  institutional and legal factors are assumed to cause firms to
increase or decrease leverage around some "target," analogously to the way taxes and
bankruptcy costs affect leverage in static-tradeoff models of  capital  structure.2 This
contrasts with pecking order theories that posit that firms prefer to use some sources of
financing over others, and that in order to finance an investment they tend to use the
preferred source more heavily before they access a less preferred source (see Myers and
Majluf (1984) for a hierarchy of sources based on differences in adverse selection costs in
the equity and debt markets.
If there exists a pecking order of financing choices,  either for the reasons
suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) or because the uneven development of a country's
financial institutions makes some forms of financing more efficient than others, then a
linear model may be biased.  Consider the firm's choice of external financing as a two-
step process. First, the firm decides to access a particular source of financing, and second,
it chooses the proportion of investment to finance from that particular source. The
considerations that determine the two choices may be very different. Thus, for example, a
particular source of financing, say debt financing for a service industry firm, may not be
optimal for funding investment, and such a firm may not attempt to obtain any debt
financing. As a result, the state of financial and legal institutions in its country may not be
germane in explaining its lack of debt. Including this firm in a simple regression with the
debt level as a dependent variable  and institutional variables as explanatory variables  on
the right hand may introduce biases. A similar potential for bias might arise if there exists
2 There is an active debate on precisely how the legal system affects the financing of firms. See, for
example, LLSV (1998, 2000), Rajan and Zingales (1999), Pistor (1999), Modigliani and Perotti (1998),  and
7a fixed cost of choosing a particular form of financing, perhaps due to obstacles
stemming from underdeveloped institutions in the country, or from the firm's
characteristics  (e.g., a small firm might be shut out of the public market for equity if the
fixed cost of equity issuance  is high). In such cases there might be a discontinuity in the
firm's use of a particular type of financing. It might avoid that form of financing until its
benefits reach a critical threshold, at which point the firm might use it heavily.
In analyzing financing choices, the literature defnes external finance narrowly,
focusing on bank debt, long-term debt and equity finance. Theory suggests that firms in
countries with strong legal systems, in which property rights, and in particular the rights
of investors, are enforced are likely to rely on these types of external finance. In countries
with weaker legal systems we would expect substitute forms of external finance,  such as
informal and trade credit and international  development bank investment,  to be used.
Thus, a narrow definition of external  financing that does not take into account other
forms of financing might overstate both the constraints on extemal financing available to
firms in less developed countries and the importance of legal development for the
financing of firms in these countries.3
Due to data limitations, firm-level cross-country studies of financing restrict their
samples to large listed firms.  However, such firms are not typical of their economies.  A
priori, it is not clear whether in countries with weak legal systems such firms are more or
less likely to be at a disadvantage relative to other firms.  Since larger firms coordinate
larger numbers of employees and more capital, they are likely to require more
Stulz and Williamson (2001).
In some countries these  informal financial systems are prevalent and economically significant.  For
example the amount of foreign transfers through the [informal] hawala system in  Pakistan, estimated by the
8sophisticated corporate  governance systems and greater access to long-term financing.
This suggests that that studies that focus on these firms overstate the importance of well-
developed institutions to the average  firm. However, it is also possible that the largest
firms may be those more adapted to their country's economy due to factors such as
political connections or because their industry has a comparative advantage in its
economy.  This suggests a degree of "convergence"  between the largest firms across
countries.4 A priori, we do not know which of these two effects predominates,  and
whether existing studies  accurately measure differences  in the ability of representative
firms to raise capital across economies.
A key issue in comparing access to long-term  financing across countries is to
identify firms, which have an external  financing need. Since the firm's external financing
need is not generally observed,  it must be inferred.  While there are several alternative
methodologies for identifying firms that have investment opportunities that cannot be
funded internally, their power in isolating firms of different sizes across countries has not
been established.5
In this paper, we use a two-stage model of the financing process and data from the
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) to address these shortcomings. The WBES
is a unique survey that has information on financing choices for close to 3000 firms in 48
Minister of Finance to be between  $2 billion to $5 billion annually, exceeds  the amount transferred
through the country's banking system (New  York Times, October  3, 2001).
4 Demirguc-Kunt'and  Maksimovic (2002) find that a large proportion of the largest firms in countries with
weak funancial  systems are not financially constrained.
5  Fazzari, Hubbard,  and Petersen (FHP) (1988) interpret firms to be financially constrained if they are
observed to have a high correlation between long-term investment and internal financing,  after controlling
for investment opportunities.  See Kaplan and Zingales (1998) for a critique of the FHP methodology  and
FHP (1999) for a response. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (1998) rely on a financial planning model to
obtain the maximum growth rate firms can attain without access to external  finance.  If they are actually
growing faster than this predicted rat e, this reveals that they are externally-financed and potentially
9countries.  This database  has a number of  advantages. 6 First, the survey covers how fmns
finance their investment in detail.  We have information on what proportion of
investment is financed externally, and whether this financing comes from debt, equity,
suppliers' credit,  leasing, and other sources such as development banks, moneylenders,
public sector or other informal sources.  Second, eighty percent of the surveyed firms are
small and medium enterprises.  This is critical  since the database allows us to investigate
a population of fins we have not been able to study before.  Third, the survey also
provides detailed information on whether the firms perceive financing issues to be
obstacles to their growth.  Thus, these reports provide a direct proxy for the firms'
financing needs.
The WBES data allows us to ask the following questions:
*  Is the proportion of investment financed externally from all sources dependent
on a country's  financial and legal institutions?
*  How do the country's institutions affect whether a firm uses a specific type of
external financing?
*  How do a country's institutions affect the proportions of different types of
external financing by firms that use them?
*  Do differences in institutions affect the financing of large and small firms
differently?
*  Is there evidence of a pecking order of financing types? If so, does the
pecking order depend on the country's institutions?
constrained.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) use extemal finance use in U.S. industries as benchmark to
determine  extemal financing needs.
10To address these questions we decompose the financing decisions of firms into
two stages, the decision to access a form of financing,  and, if the firm does so, the
decision on how much to obtain. In our statistical specification, described below, we use
Heckman's two-stage estimator to allow for the fact that firms self-select to obtain a
particular form of financing.
Consistent with the empirical tests of the pecking order theory using US data by
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and Frank and Goyal (2001), we recognize that the
firm may attempt to meet its financing needs by using sources of financing sequentially.
While these studies  focus on the United States, we allow for the possibility that
institutions in each country might favor a certain type of financing and that access to
other markets may be difficult.  Thus, we do not necessarily  expect the classical pecking
order to hold across the sample and initially do not impose such an ordering.  However,
having established differences in the access to financing, in Section 5 we examine
whether the data are consistent with a pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984).
Our tests of the classical pecking order differ from those of Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999) and Frank and Goyal (2001) in that these papers test whether firms issue debt or
equity to fund their external financing need. By contrast, the firms in our data set do not
report the value of their extemal financing calculated from financial statements.  Instead,
they provide qualitative reports of the extent to which they face financing obstacles and
we directly relate these reports to the likelihood that a firm issues a debt or equity to fund
its investment.
6 A detailed discussion of the data base is  provided in next section. Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001)
and Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (200la) also use this data set.  See Graham and Harvey (2001)
for a recent application  of the survey methodology to corporate finance.3.  Data and Summary Statistics
The firm level data is from the World Business Environment  Survey (WBES), a
major cross-sectional survey conducted in developed and developing countries in  1999
and led by the World Bank.  Information on financing patterns is available for nearly
3000 firms in 48 countries.7 The main purpose of the survey is to identify obstacles to
firm performance  and growth around the world. Thus, in addition to financing patterns,
the survey has information  on the perceived financing obstacles firms face.  The survey
also includes  data on fum employment, sales, industry, growth, ownership, and whether
the firm is an exporter or has been receiving subsidies from national or local authorities.
An important strength of the survey is its wide coverage of small and medium
firms. The survey covers three groups of firms.  Small firms are defined as those with 5
to 50 employees.  Medium firms are those that employ 51  to 500 employees  and large
firms are those that employ more than 500 employees.  Forty percent of our observations
are from small firms, another forty percent are from medium  firms and the remaining
twenty percent are from large firms.  Table AI in the Appendix reports the number of
firms for each country in the sample.
In Table I we summarize relevant facts about the level of economic and
institutional development in the sample countries.  Details of sources are in the
Appendix. Country level variables are 1995-1999 averages.  For each country we present
data on GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP and inflation.  In addition, we present an
indicator of financial system development commonly used in the literature:  the ratio of
7The survey actually covers 80 economies, but the sample is reduced because of missing firm-level
observations or country information.
12credit issued to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions
to the GDP. This indicator, Privo, is defined and discussed in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine (2000).
To capture the extent of legal development, we use an index, produced by the
International  Country Risk rating agency, that reflects the degree to which the citizens of
a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws
and adjudicate disputes.  The index, Laworder, is scored between  1 and 6, with higher
values indicating sound political institutions and a strong court system.  Finally, we also
use Common, which is a dummy variable that takes the value one for countries with
common law origin, and zero otherwise.  Common law countries are shown to have better
legal protection  for outside investors, as discussed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer
and Vishny (1998).
Inspection of Table I reveals that there is a great deal of economic and
institutional variation in the sample countries.  The per capita income ranges from Haiti,
with an average GDP per capita of 369 dollars to U.S. and Germany, with per capita
income of over $30,000.  We also provide the average  annual growth rate of per capita
GDP as a control variable.  If investment opportunities  in an economy are correlated,
there should be a statistical relation between the growth rate of the economy and the
external financing need and financing patterns of individual firms.  Average inflation rate
also provides an important control in that it is an indicator of whether the local currency
provides a stable measure of value in contracting.  The countries also vary significantly in
the rate of inflation,  from a low of zero percent  in the cases of Sweden and Argentina, up
to 86 percent in the case of Bulgaria.
13Column 4 of Table I shows the reported firm-level  financing  obstacles averaged
over all firms sampled by WBES in each country.  In the WBES, enterprise managers
were asked to rate how problematic  were financing issues for the operation and growth of
their businesses.  The ratings were quantified by assigning them values:  1, no obstacle; 2,
minor obstacle; 3, moderate obstacle; and 4, major obstacle.  As Table I illustrates, in
general the obstacle tends to be lower in developed countries such as the U.K. and the
U.S. compared to those in developing countries.
One potential problem with use of survey data is that enterprise managers  may
have different perceptions about obstacles and may rate equivalent  obstacles differently.
For example,  managers may evaluate obstacles relative to their own prior experience or
-relative to the experiences of similar firms in their own country.  This may make it more
difficult to observe a systematic relation between the obstacles firms report and their
fmancing decisions.  However, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,  and Maksimovic  (2001 a) show that
reported obstacles are significantly related to the firm's growth rate.
In the last two columns we report our financial and legal development indicators.
Credit provided by financial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP, Privo, and
the index of legal development, Laworder, are  both higher in more developed countries.
We expect firms in these countries to have better access to extemal finance. In some of
the specifications we report below we also measure access to publicly traded equity
markets by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, Mcap.8
Table II reports firm-level financing pattems averaged over all firms in each
country.  In the WBES, enterprise  managers were asked to report how much of their
8  Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) discuss the properties of alternative measures of stock market
development  and present comparative sunmmary statistics.
14investment they finance from different sources over the last year.  The sources are
internal financial sources  such as retained earnings or funds from family and friends, and
external  financial sources, such as equity, local commercial banks, foreign banks,
suppliers credit, leasing arrangements, development banks, moneylenders,  or other
informal sources.  The sum of these proportions adds up to one hundred.9
We categorize the different sources of external financing into four groups. "Bank
finance" includes financing from local and foreign banks.  "Equity finance" is financing
through sale of stock.  We group trade credit and leasing finance under "operations
finance."  Finally, finance from development banks, moneylenders, public and other
sources are grouped into a residual category,  "other finance."
As Figure I and the first column of  Table II show, in most countries including
developed ones such as the U.S., U.K. and Germany, firms use internal resources to
finance over 50 percent of their investment.  These figures are somewhat puzzling since
firms in quite a few developing countries- such as Colombia, Malaysia, Poland and others
-use more external finance than firms in the U.S., where financial  and legal development
is one of the highest rated.  It is not surprising that in some transitional countries with
poorly developed institutions such as Armenia and Azerbaijan internal financing of
investment can be as high as 90 percent.  However,  in the other extreme there are
countries such as Italy and Trinidad and Tobago where intemal financing is at about 30
percent.
Looking at different financing sources is informative since countries with similar
overall external financing proportions can have very different financing patterns. For
example, firms in Nicaragua and Malaysia appear to have similar financing patterns if
9 For a few firms, the sum were either greater or less than one hundred. These observations  were omitted.
15one looks at only the external financing proportion.  However, Nicaraguan fi-ms finance
a large proportion of  their investment using funds from development banks and
miscellaneous other sources, whereas Malaysian firms use ten times more equity.  Thus,
a cursory examination indicates that in countries where bank and equity financing
comprise a lower fraction of  external  finance, firms rely more on operations finance and
other residual  finance.
Table II shows that the most common source of  external finance is bank finance
followed by operations finance.  But patterns of finance vary with firm characteristics, as
can be seen in Table m, which reports the sample statistics of the variables we consider
and their correlations.  Small firms tend to rely on internal finance to a greater extent,
with lower proportions of bank and other finance.  It is expected for smaller, less
established firms to have difficulty accessing public markets and banks, but these figures
also provide evidence that finance from public sources also go to mostly larger firms.
There are also differences among industries.  Manufacturing firms are the greatest users
of external finance, particularly bank finance.
Subsidized firms utilize more external finance, mostly through bank and other
(including state) sources.  Similarly government firms receive more external finance,
mostly from other sources.  Foreign firms utilize more external  finance, and make greater
use of  bank finance and less operations  finance compared to domestic firms.  Since these
tend to be well-established  companies, they probably have access to international
financial markets.  Growing firms tend to use more external finance in the form of equity
finance.
16As expected, the proportion of investment extemally financed is higher in richer,
growing countries with low inflation,  and developed financial systems.  External finance
is also higher in common law countries and lower in transition economies.  This is
because common law countries tend to have more developed financial systems and better
protection of investor rights whereas countries that transition from centralized to market
economies are still in the process of developing their financial systems.
Looking at individual financing sources, bank and equity finance  are higher in
richer, high growth, low inflation countries. Development of financial institutions is
correlated with bank finance, but not equity finance.  Better legal development is
associated with more equity finance but less bank and operations finance.  As in the case
of external finance, common law countries are more likely to utilize bank and equity
finance.  Transition countries are more likely to use equity finance compared to other
sources.  Other finance is a common source for large, subsidized, government firms and
is less likely in common law countries where both banking and capital markets tend to be
well developed.
Finally, the correlations with firm-level financing obstacles indicate that firms
that use operations and other finance report higher obstacles, whereas those that use
equity finance report lower obstacles.
Panel C of  Table III  provides correlations among independent variables. As
expected, richer countries have more developed financial and legal systems and firms in
these countries report lower financial obstacles.  Also, financial obstacles are higher for
small, manufacturing firms, that are not growing.  They are lower for private, foreign,
and exporting firms.  They are also lower in common law countries which generally have
17high levels of financial and legal development.  These are consistent with the findings of
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001 a).
4. The Empirical Model
Because the decision to obtain extemal financing or a particular form of financing
is endogenous, estimates of the relation between the quantity of extemal financing and
firm characteristics  are potentially biased unless they take into account the fact that firms
that obtain external financing are self-selected. We control for this bias using Heckman's
two-step procedure.  Specifically, we first estimate a selection equation where we obtain
the frin's probability of getting extemal  finance (or in other specifications,  a particular
fonn of outside financing). We then use this estimate at the second stage, where we
analyze the relation between the financing mix and firm and country characteristics.
The selection or access equation is given by:
Financing dummy= a  + ,B  Firm Characteristics  + y Macroeconomic  factors  + o
Institutional factors + &_  (1)
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for firms that have
external finance (or, in some specifications,  a specific financing source) and 0 for those
who do not.  The regression also includes firm and country level controls.'0 Firm level
variables identify the firm's ownership, type of business, industry,  size and growth rate.
Specifically we include dummy variables for government-owned  firms, foreign firms,
exporting firms, and subsidy receivers.  We also include dummy variables  for
manufacturing firm and those in the service industry.  To control for firm size, we include
'° The use of similar control variables  is standard in the literature.  For a discussion Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998, 2001).
18dummy variables that identify the firm as a small or medium firm.  We also include  firm
growth rate, which is given by sales growth of the firm. Finally, we include the firm's
perceived financial obstacles, as reported in the WBES  survey. According to the pecking
order theory, firms that go to the market for external finance are expected to have a
higher financing need and are therefore likely to face higher financing obstacles.
Macroeconomic  control variables are the GDP per capita, its growth rate, and the
rate of inflation. We also include a dummy variable in the access equation to indicate
whether the country belongs to the group of countries that are transitioning  from a
centralized to market system. Finally, we include variables to capture the impact of
financial and legal development of the country.  These are Privo, Laworder and Mcap.
We also include a dummy variable to indicate whether the country has a common law
system.  In the second-stage we estimate how the firm's current investment is
financed using the following regression:
Financing proportion = a + P Firm Characteristics  + y Macroeconomic  factors  +
6 Institutional factors + E.  (2)
The dependent variable is the proportion of investment financed through external
finance or different external financing sources, respectively.  The independent variables
are as in the selection equation, with two exceptions.  First, the reported firm level
financial obstacle does not enter the financial proportion equations since we do not
expect the reported obstacle to affect the mix of financing beyond the selection of a
specific financing source.  Second,  we exclude the dummy variable indicating whether
19the country belongs to the group of countries that are transitioning from a centralized to
market system."1  These restrictions allow us to specify the Heckman model.
Estimating the two regressions  separately would lead to biased results since the
two error terms are likely to be correlated.  Thus, following Heckman's two-step
procedure,  we first obtain the estimates of the selection equation.  From these estimates
the nonselection hazard (inverse of the Mill's ratio) is computed for each observation.' 2
The two-step parameter estimates of the equation 2 are obtained by augmenting the
regression equation with the nonselection hazard.  This allows us to obtain consistent
estimates of the error variance in equation 2 ((D2),  and an estimate of the correlation
between the two disturbances (A).  Finally, the selectivity effect is generally summarized
by 8, which equals AO.
The interpretations of the coefficient estimates in the two equations differ. The
coefficients of the selection equation show which country and firm characteristics  are
associated with the use of a source of financing to fund investment.  The coefficients of
the mix equation show which variables influence the proportion of a source that is used,
given that the firm has selected that source. Since the firm may decide to use a particular
source because institutional and legal constraints prevent  it from using a different source,
there is no necessary direct relation between the amount of a source used and its
suitability for funding long-term investment.  Rather, the coefficients of the proportions
equation are descriptive,  and should be interpreted  together with the coefficients of the
access equation.
"Including  the transition dummy in  the proportion equations  does not lead to significant coefficients,  or
different conclusions regarding the other variables in  the model.  Excluding it  from the proportion equation
does improve the overall fit of the model, however.
20Using this basic model, we also explore a number of questions.  First, we
investigate whether a firm's total use of external financing depends on its characteristics
and on its country's legal and financial institutions.
Second, replacing the total proportion of investment financed externally with the
proportion financed using a specific financing source allows us to explore financing
patterns from individual sources such as bank, equity and operations  finance.  As we can
see in Table II, it is possible for overall extemal financing to be similar in countries with
very different financing mixes.
Third, we investigate if institutional development affects financing patterns of
different size firms similarly.  To do that we create three dummy variables, small,
medium, large.  These variables take the value 1 if the firm is small (or medium or large)
and zero otherwise.  Then we interact the size dummies with the relevant institutional
variables and financing obstacles.  In this way, it is possible to see if external financing
choices of different size firms are affected differently with institutional  development or
financing needs.
Fourth, we investigate the impact of institutional development on the relation
between the firm's use of extemal capital and the obstacles to financing it reports.  If a
firm has very little need for external finance,  either because it has sufficient internal
resources  or has few growth opportunities,  it will self-finance its investments and have
very low perceived obstacles.  If however, the firm's demand for extemal finance
increases, the firm will try to access extemal financing markets, and will face a higher
12 This is given by mj = N (xj3)/M(x,3)  where  N is the normal density and M is the standard cumulative
normal, and x,3 refer to the right hand side of the selection equation.
21level of financing obstacles.  Thus we use perceived.obstacles  as a proxy for the cost of
marginal external financing it would like to obtain.
At the equilibrium amount of external financing that the firm obtains, the cost of a
marginal dollar of external financing will equal or exceed the cost of not obtaining the
needed financing.. We expect developed financial and legal institutions to ease the
movement from internal to external finance. Thus, for firms in these countries the
marginal  costs of external financing and the marginal costs of not obtaining further
financing are equalized  at a point where they obtain external financing.  As a result, in
countries with better-developed institutions, hence higher Privo and Laworder, we expect
firns' use of external finance to increase with an increase in financing needs, so that
there exists a positive relation between the reported financing obstacle and the firm's use
of external financing.
In countries with less developed institutions, financing needs can increase without
a corresponding  increase in external financing, so that there is no relation between the
firn's reported obstacle and the amount of external financing it uses. Thus, under the
hypothesis that institutional development eases the acquisition of (a specific source of)
capital we expect the interactions of institutional variables with the financing obstacles to
develop positive coefficients in the access equation.  A similar argument suggests that
there may be a positive relation between the reported financing obstacle and, say, the
amount of  equity financing that a large firm uses, but no corresponding relation for small
firms. To investigate further whether these relations are different for different size firms,
we can interact  firm size with the financial obstacle variable  and the institutional
variables.
22To test whether the existence of a pecking order of financing sources is related to
firm size and the development of a country's institutions we follow a similar approach.
We begin with a sample of firms that finance at least a portion of their investment with
bank loans. We then examine the relation between the probability that the firms also issue
equity and the level of financing obstacles reported by the firms.  As before, an absence
of a relation between these variables is uninformative because it is consistent both with
an absence of a pecking order and with a pecking order where the costs of issuing equity
are so high that only a few firms do so. However, a positive relation is consistent with a
pecking order where firmns balance the cost of additional equity issues with the cost of
foregoing  investment.  Supporting evidence is again provided by interacting the financing
obstacle with the institutional variables.  The case for the existence of a pecking order is
stronger if the positive relation between equity issuance and the financing obstacle
variable is stronger when the institutions are well developed. 13
5.  Results
Table IV shows the relation between financing pattems and firm and country
characteristics,  including institutional factors.  In Panel A, for each financing source we
estimate an access equation which helps us identify the factors that determine firms' use
of external financing or of a particular source of finance.  We define external finance as
consisting of bank, equity, operations and other finance.  The corresponding financing
proportion equations reported in Panel B indicate the significant  factors in the proportion
13  A firm facing a cash shortfall may raise money to cover the losses rather than fund new investment
projects. While the pecking order theory also applies in this case, the need to monitor such firms intensively
suggests that their financing  is affected by factors not addres sed by the theory.  These cash shortfalls are
more likely to occur in smaller, riskier firms.
23of current investment externally financed, or by the mix of different financing
proportions corresponding  to each financing source.
The most striking result in Table IV is that neither the use of external finance or
the proportion of investment financed  extemally is determined by institutional factors.
(the first specification  in panels A and B). Indeed we see that financial or legal
development are uncorrelated with extemal financing.  These results are consistent with
our earlier observation of the figures  in Table II, where countries had similar levels of
extemal finance,  yet very different financing pattems based on their institutional
development.
However, this finding contrasts with several earlier studies that find a relation
between institutional  development and the use of extemal finance by  Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic  (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998). One possible reason for the
difference is that both of these studies used empirical designs that stressed the role of
large firms. In the former study only publicly listed firms were considered,  whereas the
latter study weights large firms more heavily because a large firm affects industry growth
rates more than a small firm. A second possible reason is that we include operations
finance (such as trade credit)  and residual financing sources,  such as subsidized
govemment financing, in the category of external financing.  While these sources are not
normally included in the U.S.  studies of external financing, variations in operational  and
govemment financing may be potentially important when assessing differences in
countries' financial systems.'4
14 Frank and Maksimovic (1998)  argue that the equilibrium  amount of trade  finance relative to bank and
equity  financing is influenced by a country's legal  and financial system. See Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic  (2001)  for cross-country  evidence.
24When we examine each of the four sources of external  finance in turn, we find
that institutional development does predict firms' use of different financing sources.  The
use of bank, equity and operations finance are more common in countries with common
law legal origin, where outside investor protections are stronger.  In countries with better-
developed financial institutions firms are more likely to access other financing sources,
and less likely to access equity finance.  In countries with better developed legal systems
firms are less likely to choose operations finance,  since firms' use of  bank debt relative to
trade credit tends to be higher in countries with efficient legal systems (see Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001).
Panel A of Table IV also shows that firms which report greater financing
obstacles are more likely to use external  finance. This is consistent with our interpretation
of firms with greater financing need reporting higher obstacles. We also see that firms
reporting greater financing constraints are more likely to use each source of external
finance to fund investment.
Overall, we see that different institutions are important in sometimes conflicting
ways for different financing sources.  In Panel B, the firms that use bank financing use a
higher proportion of bank finance if their country has an efficient legal system'5, but
lower proportions of "other financing" sources.  In countries with well-developed
financial institutions - high Privo - firms use a smaller proportion of equity finance, even
after controlling for the fact that equity financing is less common in such countries.
Finally, in common law systems with strong protection of investor rights, while more
1 If we look at only large firms, Privo is positive and significant  in the bank finance equation, consistent
with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)  who analyze  large  firms.
25firms have access to operations finance,  they finance a lower proportion of their
investment in this way.'6
In contrast,  the value of market capitalization  relative to GDP, Mcap, does not
predict the equity financing of investment by firms in our sample. While the existence of
a large public market might be expected to lead to more equity financing, the role of the
market in investment may dependent on the market's level of activity, which fluctuates
over time and requires a time-series to capture.'7
We also examine whether financing patterns vary with the per capita income of
countries. The institutions of richer countries are more likely to adapt to finding modern
commercial enterprises.  As a result, per capita income is likely to proxy for aspects of
institutional development that we do not measure explicitly.'8 Consistent with earlier
results, Table IV shows that the use of external finance does not differ by country
income. However, we again find differences in the use of different sources. In high-
income countries, firms are more likely to issue equity in order to finance investment.
Controlling for the likelihood of use of each source, in these countries firms rely more on
equity and less bank debt to finance investment. These results are consistent with Myers
(1977).
We also see that smaller firms are indeed less likely to use external finance than
large firms, particularly the sources of external finance that depend on financial
institutions, bank debt and equity finance. However, once we control  for this tendency,
1 6Recall  that we measure the proportion of investment financed by different external sources, not the
absolute amount of a particular source used. Thus, this does not mean that the absolute amount of
operational  finance used is less.
17 Since we lose a number of countries when  we include Mcap,  we ran the equity finance regressions also
without Mcap, and obtained the same results.
26we cannot reject the hypothesis that small firms, which do access bank and equity
markets, fund the same proportion of their investment from these sources as larger firms.
By contrast, small firms that use operations finance use it more intensively than other
firms.
Table IV identifies  several fmn characteristics that predict differences in the ways
investment is funded.  Government firms are more likely to use bank and "other" finance.
Subsidized firms are more likely to use "other" finance sources, suggesting that this form
of financing may be a conduit for subsidies.  Exporters are more likely to use bank and
operations finance, and foreign firms are more likely to issue equity, but less likely to use
operations  finance.  Manufacturing  firms are more likely to use bank and operations
finance but less likely to use equity financing.
Firms in growing economies are more likely to use all types of external financing
to fund investment.  High growth is associated with the use of more equity and less debt
and operations financing, controlling for the use of each respective financing source.
Similar, albeit somewhat weaker results hold for firm growth, once we hold the growth of
the economy constant.  These findings are consistent with Myers'  (1977) conclusion that
firms fund growth opportunities with equity,  and suggest that Myers'  analysis is quite
robust and holds for firms in very different institutional settings.
As inflation increases,  both the likelihood that a firm obtains external  financing
and the proportion of investment financed externally decline. Again, there are differences
across sources of finance.  Firms in high inflation countries are less likely to access bank
loans and use a smaller proportion of loans in their financing mix. The opposite is true for
1The use of income as a  proxy for institutional  adaptation is  justified here because we are predicting
financing patterns of firms, and not attempting to identify specific institutional  features that predict
27equity finance, probably because equity provides better protection against inflation for
investors.
We next explore whether these differences  in financing between large and small
firms arise because institutional  development and financing needs result in different
financing choices for large and small firms. To do this we interact the size dummies with
the financing and legal development variables and financing obstacles in the access
equation in Table V.'9
Inspection of Table V reveals, first, that the relationship between access to
external finance and financing need is more significant for the larger firms.  For small
finns, an increase in financial needs increases their external finance but we do not see any
significant result looking at individual financing sources.  For medium firms and
particularly large firms, however, an increase  in financing needs leads to a higher
probability of access to all financing sources.
Second,  as in Table IV, we see firms have greater access to bank, equity and
operations finance in common law countries. In countries with developed legal systems
firms are less likely to use operations finance.  These results hold regardless of size
differences.  Small firms in countries with higher Mcap  (financial institutions), obtain
more (less) equity finance, suggesting that the access of the smallest firms to equity
finance is affected by the size of  the public equity markets relative to the size of the
banking sector.20
economic growth or high per capita i ncome.
9  It is also possible to explore the size breakdown for Privo and Laworder in the financing  proportion
equation, but estimating such a model  does not reveal significant differences among size groups.  Similarly,
interacting Common with size dummies in either equation does not reveal  significant differences among
size groups.
20 While the probability that smallest and largest finance  some portion of their investment using bank debt
is not affected by the size of the banking sector, the negative coefficient of Privo-medium  is significant.
28In institutionally more developed countries we expect firns with greater financing
need to be more likely to choose extemal finance.  Hence, we expect the relation between
financing needs and access to external finance to be stronger in countries with more
developed institutions.21 Table VI reports the results obtained by re-estimating the model
in Table V and adding interaction terms of financing obstacles with Privo and Laworder
for different size groups.
We find that in countries with better-developed  financial  institutions, firms with a
greater financing need are more likely to use external finance.  When we look at
individual financing sources, we see that this relationship holds for bank and equity
finance, but not for operations and other finance.  The relation is stronger for larger firms,
particularly  in the case of equity finance.22
The estimates in the preceding tables show that firms with a greater financing
need are more likely to rely on external finance.  However, thus far we have not imposed
an a priori ordering of sources of external funding that predicts the sequence in which a
firm accesses external finance. The pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984)
posits that adverse selection in the market for external finance makes it efficient for the
firm to rely on internal and operations  finance first, and when these sources are exhausted
to borrow. The theory suggest that since equity is subject to the highest adverse selection
costs,' firms issue equity as a last resort.
Since it is a priori unlikely that bank development negatively  affects medium size firm, but not larger and
smaller firms, we do not interpret this coefficient except to note that such a configuration may occur by
chance.
21 In the extreme  case of a very well developed financial  system, we would find no correlation between
financing needs and access in our.  However, for most countries  we expect to see  an increase in financing
obstacles as external financing needs increase.
22 Interacting financing obstacles with stock market capitalization rather than Privo gives very similar
results.
29If the pecking order theory is correct, we would expect firms that issue equity to
report higher fmnancing obstacles than firms that do not. We would also expect firms in
economies with good financial and legal systems to have lower costs in issuing equity
than firns in countries with poorly performing financial and legal systems.
To test the pecking order theory, we create two variables.  Variable Peck takes the
value zero if the firm uses only bank or operations  finance, and one if in addition to these
sources it also uses equity finance to fund the current year's investment.  Variable  Peck2
uses a finer ordering where it takes the value zero if the firm only uses operations
finance, I if it also uses bank finance, and 2 if it also uses equity finance.  In creating
both variables we drop those firms that only use other sources of financing. Then we
estimate the following specification:
Peck or Peck2 = a + 3 Firm Characteristics  + y Macroeconomic  factors  + o
Institutional factors + ,.  (3)
We estimate the model using Logit or Ordered Logit Model depending on the
dependent variable we use. If the pecking order theory holds, we expect the coefficient on
financing obstacle to be positive and significant,  i.e., the higher the firm level financing
needs, the more likely the firm is to use equity finance.
Table VII reports the results of the model with Peck, using Logit probability
model.  As in the rest of the paper, we investigate the impact of institutional development
and firm size on the validity of the pecking order theory. In column I we see that growing
firms in fast growing, Common law countries with relatively small banking systems are
more likely to finance investment with both equity and bank debt.
30The negative relation between the size of the banking system and the probability
of issuing equity holds across specification in Table VII. It is consistent with the notion
that in counties with large banking systems firms with existing borrowing relations with
bank substitute more bank borrowing for equity issuance.
The coefficient of the financing obstacle is not significant,  indicating that for the
sample as a whole financing need is not related to the probability of equity issuance.
Thus, for the sample as a whole there is no evidence that firms trade-off higher equity
issuance costs (as in Myers-Majluf (1984))  their financing need.  To investigate whether
this result is driven by firm size, in column 2 Privo, Laworder and Financing obstacles
are interacted with size dummies, small, medium and large.
We see that the coefficient  of financing obstacles develops  a significant  sign only
for small firms.  However, the coefficient is negative indicating that small firms with
greater financing needs are less likely to use equity.  Thus, this result does not lend
support for the hypothesis that firms issuing equity trade off higher adverse selection
costs against the benefit of relaxing high financing constraints.
In Column 3 we investigate whether the effect of the firm's reported financial
obstacles on its probability of issuing equity depends on the development of the financial
system. To this end, in Column 3 we augment the specification with a variable that
interacts the firm's reported fnancing obstacles with Privo, the proxy for the
development of the financial system. As before, we find no evidence that a higher
reported financial obstacle implies that firms are more likely to issue equity. However,
coefficient of the interaction term, Financial Obstacle*Privo, is positive and highly
significant.  Thus, firms with greater financing needs are more likely to issue equity if
31they are in countries with well-developed financial  systems. When we allow this
interaction to depend on the size of the firm in Column 4 we further find that the positive
relation between the issuance of equity and the financial needs of firms in countries with
good fnancial systems only holds for large firms. Small and medium sized firms are not
more likely to issue equity when they face greater financing need even in countries with
well-developed  financial systems.
In Table VIII we provide some robustness checks.  In Panel A we introduce four
additional variables into the analysis.  These are Concentration,  which is the
concentration ratio of the banking system based on the largest five banks,  State-owned,
which is the proportion of banking system assets owned by the government, Corruption,
which is an indicator of to what extent firms find corruption in bank officials constraining
to their growth, and Restrict, which is an indicator of restrictions  on bank activities.  We
see that the above results are robust to inclusion of these controls, in that we still see
evidence consistent with pecking order in countries with developed financial systems,
particularly for large firms.  Among the controls, firms in countries with concentrated
banking systems and greater activity restrictions are less likely to issue equity, whereas
those in countries that are dominated by state banks are more likely.
In Panel B, we replicate the regressions  in Table VII replacing Peck by Peck2 and
use the Ordered Logit Model to estimate.  The results are not significantly different using
this specification either.
In sum, the hierarchy suggested by pecking order theory holds for large firms in
countries with well-developed financial systems.  For these firms there is a positive and
significant relation between reported financial obstacles and the probability that the firm
32issues equity. For small and medium  firms, or for firms in countries with less developed
financial systems a high financing need does not increase the probability that the firm
issues equity. Indeed, there is some evidence  that small firms that face lower financing
obstacles  are more likely to issue equity.
The control variables develop expected signs, consistent with earlier results.
Growing firms in richer, faster growing countries use more equity finance.  Firms in
transition countries and those with common law systems use more equity finance.  More
developed financial systems and more efficient  legal systems (for medium firms) lead to
greater use of bank finance.  Finally, foreign firms are more likely to use equity and
manufacturing firms less.
6.  Conclusions
In this paper we investigate two issues.  The first is how firm financing patterns
differ around the world. The second is how financial obstacles perceived by firms are
related to their financing patterns. This allows us to test the pecking order theory of
capital structure.  In answering both questions,  we focus on the impact of institutional
development,  particularly on legal and financial institutions and firm size.
Using a unique survey database that has good coverage of small and medium
enterprises in 48 countries, we find that the extemal financing of firm investment is not a
function of institutions.  Firms appear to finance similar proportions  of their investment
using extemal financing regardless of institutional development.  The difference is that in
underdeveloped countries, they are less able to obtain debt and equity finance, therefore
they use more operations finance or finance from other sources.  In contrast, we see that
the form of extemal finance is predicted by institutional  development.  Our results
33indicate that legal and financial institutions affect different types of  extemal finance
differently.
We also see that firm size is a key determinant of whether firms can have access
to different types of external finance.  Our results indicate small firms with greater
financing needs cannot obtain extemal finance as easily as larger firms because of access
issues.
Looking at the reported firm-level obstacles and how they affect access to
external finance in countries with different  levels of institutional development, we find
that in countries with better developed financial institutions,  firms with higher financing
needs are more likely to use extemal finance.  This relation holds for bank and equity
finance, especially for large firms, but not for operations finance and financing from
residual  sources. These findings are also consistent with the result that firms in countries
with more developed institutions use bank and equity finance to a greater extent, whereas
in institutionally underdeveloped countries operations finance  and financing from
residual sources substitute to offset the shortfall in external  finance.  Finally, we find
evidence consistent with pecking order theory only in financially developed countries,
and particularly for large firms.
Our results suggest a shift of focus in looking at institutional differences  across
countries.  If the relationship between institutions and firmn financing patterns hinge on
firm size, determinants  of optimal firm size deserve a closer look.  Underdeveloped
financial and legal systems can create costs by creating incentives for sub-optimal firm
sizes which can have important implications for the relative size and development  of the
small and medium enterprise (SME)  sector.  Development institutions  devote large
34amount of resources to SMEs because they are believed to be crucial for economic
growth and poverty alleviation.  However underdevelopment  of  the financial and legal
systems may be the reason it is optimal for fimns to stay small, hindering SME growth.
Better understanding these costs is crucial in designing policies for developing small and
medium enterprises. Although these costs may vary across industries, they cannot be
detected by industry level studies.  We turn to this issue in Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (2001b).
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F'igure 1. Financing  Pattemns  Around the World.  Internal  finace is the proportion of investment  financed
by retained earnings and from famnily and  friends.  All other  financing are considered external.  Values reported
are  firm  averages by country.  Countries  are ranked in descending order according to internal financing.
39Table I
Economic and Institutional Indicators
GDP per capita is real GDP per capita  in USS. Inflation is the log difference of the Consumer Price Index. Growth  is the growth rate
of GDP in USS. Privo is financial sector credit to private sector divided by GDP. Laworder is an index  (1-6) that takes higher values
for legal systems that are more developed.  All country variables are 1995-1999 averages.  Financing obstacles  are general obstacles
as indicated in the firm questionnaire.  They take values I to 4, with higher values indicating greater obstacles. Firm  variables are
averaged over all firms in each country.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Gdp/capita  hIflation  Growth  Finance  Obs.  Privo  Laworder
Argentina  8000  0.00  0.02  3.14  0.21  5.00
Armenia  844  0.10  0.04  2.43  0.06  4.00
Bulgaria  1415  0.86  -0.02  3.17  0.14  4.00
Belarus  2235  0.71  0.07  3.25  0.06  4.00
Bolivia  939  0.06  0.01  3.08  0.51  3.00
Brazil  4492  0.07  0.00  2.73  0.32  2.05
Canada  20549  0.01  0.02  2.05  0.83  6.00
Chile  5003  0.05  0.03  2.30  0.68  5.00
China  677  0.02  0.07  3.35  0.85  5.00
Colombia  2381  0.16  -0.01  2.68  0.36  2.00
Costa Rica  3692  0.12  0.04  2.59  0.15  4.00
Czech Republic  5158  0.07  0.00  3.16  0.58  5.14
Germany  30794  0.01  0.01  2.61  1.06  6.00
Dominican Rep.  1712  0.06  0.06  2.57  0.24  4.00
Ecuador  1538  0.30  -0.02  3.19  0.30  3.36
Spain  15858  0.02  0.03  2.35  0.79  4.00
Estonia  3663  0.10  0.05  2.40  0.16  4.00
France  27720  0.01  0.02  2.81  0.84  5.00
U.K.  20187  0.03  0.02  2.30  1.16  6.00
Guatemala  1503  0.08  0.01  3.22  0.18  2.14
Honduras  708  0.16  0.00  2.93  0.26  2.05
Croatia  3845  0.05  0.05  3.28  0.00  5.00
Haiti  369  0.14  0.00  3.34  0.12  2.59
Hungary  4706  0.15  0.04  2.58  0.22  6.00
Indonesia  1045  0.20  -0.02  2.48  0.52  2.64
Italy  19646  0.02  0.01  2.04  0.57  6.00
Lithuania  1908  0.09  0.03  3.02  0.11  4.00
Moldova  668  0.18  -0.03  3.29  0.06  5.00
Mexico  3395  0.20  0.04  3.48  0.22  2.41
Malaysia  4536  0.03  0.01  2.62  1.31  4.59
Nicaragua  435  0.11  0.03  3.27  0.31  4.00
Pakistan  506  0.08  0.00  3.24  0.23  3.14
Panama  3124  0.01  0.02  2.13  0.78  3.00
Peru  2335  0.07  0.01  3.30  0.18  3.00
Philippines  1126  0.08  0.01  2.68  0.50  4.00
Poland  3216  0.13  0.05  2.49  0.12  5.00
Romania  1372  0.53  -0.02  3.29  0.09  4.77
Singapore  24948  0.01  0.02  2.03  1.11  6.00
El Salvador  1706  0.04  0.01  3.03  0.36  3.00
Slovakia  3805  0.07  0.04  3.45  0.30  5.00
Slovenia  10233  0.08  0.04  2.29  0.26  5.00
Sweden  28258  0.00  0.02  1.83  0.82  6.00
Trinidad &  Tobago  4526  0.04  0.04  2.91  0.40  4.00
Turkey  2994  0.58  0.01  3.17  0.16  3.91
Ukraine  867  0.26  -0.03  3.49  0.02  4.00
Uruguay  6114  0.15  0.02  2.78  0.27  3.00
U.S.  29250  0.02  0.03  2.31  1.84  6.00
Venezuela  3483  0.40  -0.02  2.63  0.10  4.00
40Table II
Financing Patterns Around the World
Figures given are firm averages  for each country and they are the proportion of investment financed by each source.
External finance includes financing from banks, equity, operations and other finance. Bank finance includes  financing
from domestic as well as foreign banks.  Operations finance is the sum of leasing and supplier  credit.  Other financing
includes financing from development banks, money lenders, public sector and other sources.
External  Bank  Operations
Finance  Finance  Equity  Finance  Other
Argentina  42.89  30.09  2.53  8.17  2.10
Armenia  9.48  3.19  0.95  1.86  3.48
Bulgaria  25.33  6.40  1.40  9.13  8.40
Belarus  22.40  4.88  1.39  5.42  10.71
Bolivia  39.56  24.39  0.93  9.40  4.84
Brazil  54.08  25.59  5.52  16.38  6.59
Canada  49.91  21.59  11.73  5.12  11.47
Chile  54.32  38.19  0.30  9.62  6.21
China  32.62  10.67  2.56  3.95  15.44
Colombia  56.26  28.59  0.81  14.31  12.55
Costa Rica  35.17  17.46  0.16  7.69  9.86
Czech Republic  26.85  10.17  0.80  6.93  8.95
Germany  47.41  14.30  19.85  1.43  11.83
Dominican Rep.  43.29  26.81  1.79  9.69  5.00
Ecuador  50.51  16.09  3.18  19.46  11.78
Spain  34.45  20.42  0.82  9.43  3.78
Estonia  60.58  20.02  15.88  15.25  9.42
France  35.65  10.80  6.67  11.02  7.17
U.KY  39.12  14.53  9.49  9.61  5.50
Guatemala  52.22  27.95  0.63  16.89  6.75
Honduras  36.47  20.29  0.81  8.68  6.69
Croatia  41.76  20.28  4.66  9.39  7.42
Haiti  31.18  11.41  1.76  3.65  14.36
Hungary  34.84  15.09  6.02  6.53  7.20
Indonesia  20.47  16.09  0.00  2.19  2.19
Italy  73.52  42.77  7.25  11.39  12.11
Lithuania  33.99  8.65  12.25  7.94  5.15
Moldova  17.88  7.27  0.30  6.58  3.73
Mexico  39.34  10.79  4.42  16.14  7.99
Malaysia  57.61  16.27  10.88  24.57  5.88
Nicaragua  55.86  17.17  1.78  16.38  20.53
Pakistan  41.55  29.62  4.66  4.34  2.93
Panama  62.81  45.34  1.39  8.65  7.43
Peru  42.19  25.69  0.85  10.05  5.60
Philippines  36.03  19.27  1.69  10.88  4.19
Poland  58.32  13.16  30.53  8.07  6.56
Romania  24.00  10.30  2.39  5.35  5.96
Singapore  39.07  24.07  7.13  6.02  1.85
El Salvador  51.67  26.72  3.85  14.20  6.90
Slovakia  30.88  11.34  1.22  11.83  6.49
Slovenia  38.54  16.98  3.38  10.46  7.71
Sweden  45.45  19.16  10.80  7.24  8.26
Trinidad&Tobago  71.04  37.26  15.68  15.49  2.60
Turkey  42.17  20.88  8.28  6.17  6.85
Ukraine  24.01  6.38  2.21  8.05  7.36
Uruguay  53.30  33.01  1.32  15.21  3.76
U.S.  46.46  20.33  3.04  10.59  12.50
Venezuela  29.16  15.16  3.04  7.12  3.84
41Table Hl
Summary Statistics and Correlations
Summary  statistics and correlation matrices are presented. N refers to firm level observations for 48 countries.  Bank finance, Equity,
Operations Finance, and Other Finance are financing proportions that stand for the proportion of investment fmanced  extemally, by
bank debt, equity, operations financing and other sources.  Financing obstacles are general obstacles as indicated in the WBES firm
questionnaire.  They take values of I to 4, where I indicates no obstacle and 4 indicates major obstacle.  Finn size takes the value  1, 2,
3 for small, medium and large finns.  Sector variable identifies manufacturing,  services, construction, agriculture and other sectors.
Firm growth is given by percent change in sales.  Government and Foreign are dununy variables that take the value I if the firm has
govemment or foreign  ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable  that indicates if  the fim is an exporting firm.
Subsidized is also a dummy variable that indicates if the firm receives subsidies from the national or local authorities. Gdp/ capita  is
real Gdp per capita in thousands of USS.  Inflation is the log difference  of  the Consumer Price  Index.  Growth is the growth rate of
Gdp.  Privo is the financial sector credit to the private sector divided by Gdp. Laworder is an index  (1-6)that takes higher values for
legal systems that are more developed.  Transition is a dununy variable for transition countries.  Common is a dummy variable that
takes the value  I for common  law countries and  zero otherwise.  All country  variables are  1995-1999  averages. Detailed variable
definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
External Finance  2963  41.03  38.03  0  100
Bank Finance  2963  18.96  28.11  0  100
Equity  2963  5.49  17.28  0  100
Operations  Finance  2963  9.48  19.07  0  100
Other Finance  2963  7.14  19.03  0  100
Financing Obstacle  2963  2.83  1.13  1  4
Firm Size - small  2963  0.39  OA9  0  1
Firm  Size -medium  2963  OA2  0.49  0  1
Manufacturing  2963  0.40  0.49  0  1
Services  2963  0.47  0.50  0  1
Firm Growth  2963  0.14  0.56  -I  2
Subsidized  2963  0.12  0.32  0  1
Govemment  2963  0.12  0.33  0  1
Foreign  2963  0.18  0.39  0  1
Exporter  2963  0A4I  0.49  0  1
Gdp/capita  48  6.82  8.89  0.37  30.79
Inflation  48  0.14  0.18  0.00  0.86
Growth  48  0.02  0.03  -0.03  0.07
Privo  48  OA3  0.39  0.00  1.84
Laworder  48  4.18  1.21  2  6
Common  48  0.15  0.36  0  1
Transition  48  0.31  OA7  0  1
42Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables
Small  Manufactur.  Subsidized  Government  Foreign  Exporter  Firm Gro  Gdp/capita  Inflation  Growth  Privo  Laworder  Common  Transition  Finan.  Obs
Extemal  Finance  -0.178***  0.061"*  0.097**  0.048"'  0.068**  0.133"*  0.046**  0.071***  -0.140***  0.095"*  0.083**  -0.026  0.070'*'  -0.150"'*  0.026
Bank Finance  -0.191***  0.115***  0.036*  -0.030*  0.089**  0.141***  0.009  0.059**  -0.147***  0.036*  0.105**  -0.060***  0.079***  -0.226***  -0.014
Equity  0.016  -0.053**  0.004  0.001  0.023  0.027  0.057**  0.081***  .0.047"*  0.140*0  0.001  0.114***  0.057***  0.066***  -0.049***
OperationsFinance  -0.028  0.019  -0.011  -0.012  -0.037**  0.041"  0.009  -0.013  -0.043"*  -0.003  0.010  -0.065*"  0.012  -0.038"  0.065"0
OtherFinance  -0.059***  -0.019  0.148***  0.152***  0.020  -0.007  0.019  -0.006  0.023  0.012  0.001  -0.003  -0.040**  0.013  0.051*** *  *,  *'  indicate  significance  levels of 10, 5, and  I percent  respectively
43Panel C: Correlatlon Matrix of Independent Variables
Smal  Manuf.  Subsidized  Government  Foreign  Exporter  Firm Growth  Gdp/capita  Inflation  Growth  Privo  Laworder  Conmnon  Transition
Manuf.  -0.2164**
Subsidized  -0.1519**  0.0222
Government  -0.2475**  0.0989"'  0.1868*"
Foreign  -0.20300**  0.1095?**  0.0199  -0.0166
Exporter  -0.2466**  0.3556**  0.1  144*"  0.1250*"  0.2073***
Firm Growth  -0.0124  -0.0289  0.0065  -0.0364"  0.0451"*  0.0900*"
Gdp/capita  -0.0264  -0.0793**  0.0871*0"  -0.0710***  0.1029**  0.0895"*  0.0680*"
Inflation  0.0595*'  0.0551**  -0.0213  0.1236*"  -0.1002***  -0.0753**  -0.0285  -0.3470"'
Growth  -0.0043  -0.0102  0.0539"'  0.0857**  0.0183  0.1383*"  0.1341"'  0.1391"'  -0.3314"'
Privo  -0.0103  -0.0335'  0.0645**  -0.1525**  0.1349"'  0.0452"'  0.0189  0.7401"'*  -0.4267"'*  0.1151"'
Laworder  0.1143"'  -0.0697"'  0.0722"'  0.1 180"'  -0.0114  0.0696"'  0.0839"'  0.5655"'  .0.15620*  0.2951"'  0.3584"'
Common  0.0176  -0.0376"  0.0338'  -0.0882"'  0.0227  0.0622"'  0.0197  0.4735"'  -0.2286"'  0.0665"'  0.591  1***  0.3120"'*
Transition  0.1650'"  -0.0439"'  -0.0012  0.2859"'  -0.1665"'  -0.0057  0.0386"  -0.3373"'  0.2903*"  0.1249"'  -0.4783"'  0.3080"'  -0.3041"'
Financial Obs. 0.0612"'  0.0589"'  -0.0097  0.0722"'  -0.14810"*  -0.0337*  -0.1035"'  -0.2355?  0.1635"'  -0.1374"'  -0.1997"'  -0. 1195"  *  -0.1195"'  0. 1189"'
', "  "'  indicate significance  levels of 10, 5, and I percent respectively
44Table IV
Determinants of Financing  Patterns
The estimated two-step  Heckman nodel  is (l) Access Financing Source = a +  j 1 Governmetit +  P 2ForCign +  3Exporter +  PSubsidized + 0 Manuf.+  -I  ~ 6SerVices + 0 7Firn Growth + lSmaIll+ Ilg Medium + 0 lo
GDP per capita +  P  ilnflation+ jI12GroWth + j13 Prvo --  14Laworder +  jIisCommon +  16Transition +  jijFinancing Obstacle  +e,  and (2)  Financing Proportions--a+  i GoverMMent +  2  Foreign+3
Exporter+jI4Subsidized+jIsManuf.+jI6Seiices+jIsFirmGrowth+jIsSmall+jIsMediumn+  jIioGDPpercapita+jI  1ilnflation+jIizGrowtb+P13  dV0+PJi4LaWorder+0is 5 C0niinon+E.  Accessisadummy
variable which takes the value  I for finns that use external  finance (or different financing  sources) and 0 for those  who do not.  Financing proportions  are the proportion of investment  financed  externally,  by equity,
bank debt, operations financing  or other sources.  External finance  is given by sum  of bank, equity, operations  and other finance.  Bank financing includes domestic  and foreign bank financing.  Operations  is given by
the stum of  supplier credit and leasing.  Other sources include money  lender,  development banks,  public sector and other financing.  Government and  Foreign are dummny variables that take the value  I if the  firm  has
govermecnt or foreign ownership, respectively.  Exporter  is a dumimy variable  that indicates if the fintn  is an  exporting finin.  Subsidized is also a dummny variable that indicates  if  the firm receives subsidies  fr-om  the
national or loc-al authotities.  Manufacturing  and Services  are industry dummnies.  Firm growth  is given by sales  girowth.  Snmall and Mediumn are  dummny variables that  indicate  firmn size. GDP per capita is  real GDP  per
capita in US$.  Inflation is the log  difference of the Consumer Price Index. Growth  is the growth rate of GDP  in US$.  Transition is a dummny variable  for transition countries. Privo is the finacial  institutions' credit
to the private sector divided by Gdp. Laworder  is an index  (I1-6)  that takes higher  values for legal  systems that are more developed.  Commnon is a dummy variable that takes the value I for common law countries and
zero otherwise.  Mcap is stok  market  capitaization divided by  GDP.  Financing obstacle  is the general financing obstacle as indicated in the WBES firmn questionnaire.  They take values oftI to 4, where  I indicates no
obstacle and 4 indicates  major obstacle.  Panel A reports  results of equation (1) and  Panel B  those of equation (2).  Detailed  variable definitions  and  sources are  given in the appendix.
Panel A: Access  Access(extemnal  finance)  Access(  bank debt)  Access(equity)  Acces (operations)  Access  (other)
Govemnment  -0.026  -0.171 **  -0.071  -0.107  0.319**
(0.085)  (0.082)  (0.110)  (0.083)  (0.086)
Foreign  -0.096  -0.063  0.284***  -0.196***  0.114
(0.070)  (0.066)  (0.084)  (0.067)  (0.073)
Exporter  0.253**  0.203***  0.067  0.2330*  -0.053
(0.058)  (0.055)  (0.074)  (0.056)  (0.062)
Subsidized  0.221**  -0.003  0.065  0.073  0.573***
(0.086)  (0.078)  (0.097)  (0.077)  (0.078)
Manufacturing  -0.025  0.163*  0.0334***  0. 150*  -0.107
(0.083)  (0.081)  (0.108)  (0.082)  (0.088)
Services  -0.040  -0.001  -0.1I08  0.153**  -0.026
(0.080)  (0.078)  (0.100)  (0.080)  (0.085)
Firm Growth  0.133***  0.074*  0.123**  0. 118***  0.088*
(0.045)  (0.044)  (0.061)  (0.044)  (0.048)
Small  -0.483**  0.0579***  -0.221*  -0.078  -0.185**
(0.083)  (0.077)  (0.104)  (0.078)  (0.086)
Medium  -0. 137*  -0.256**O  .0.152*  0.109  -0.103
(0.076)  (0.069)  (0.091)  (0.069)  (0.075)
GDP per capita  0.009  0.007  0.045***  0.006  -0.003
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)
Inflation  -0.383***  -0.506***  0.833***  0.03400*  0.261 *
(0.142)  (0.147)  (0.251)  (0.148)  (0.154)
Growth  3.491***  3.128***  9.875***  2.028**  1.901 
(0.972)  (1.000)  (2.329)  (1.006)  (1.075)
Privo  -0.136  -0.175  -0.701***  0.028  0.449***
(0.131)  (0.125)  (0.189)  (0.125)  (0.135)
LAworder  0.010  -0.007  -0.027  -0.1I  lo***  -0.023
(0.038)  (0.036)  (0.054)  (0.036)  (0.040)
Common  0.082  0.210*0  0.474***  0.237**  -0.171
(0.113)  (0.103)  (0.123)  (0.101)  (0.115)
Mcap  0.162
(0.142)
Transition  -0.391***  0.05560**  0.125  0.058  0.115
(0.080)  (0.076)  (0.117)  (0.078)  (0.086)
Financing Obst.  0.102***  0.076***  0.058*0  0.059***  0.11I1I  '*
(0.023)  (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.026)
XI  ~~~~~210***  208***  199**  1080**  157***
No  of  obs.  2963  2963  2402  2963  2963
, ,  indicate  significance  levels  of  10,  5,  and 1  percet respectively.
45Panel B: Financing Proportions
External  Finance  Bank Debt  Equity  Operations  Oiher
Govemment  5.890***  2.978  -5.864  5.809  16.691"*
(2.404)  (2.978)  (5.878)  (4.290)  (4.915)
Foreign  3.202*  2.181  11.614  5.680  0.332
(1.971)  (2.059)  (7.961)  (5.120)  (3.287)
Exportet  -1.514  0.688  -2.416  -9.323  4.818*
(1.887)  (1.894)  (4.492)  (5.100)  (2.779)
Subsidized  2.098  1.244  -0.709  -6.495*  9.593
(2.354)  (2.434)  (5.443)  (3.986)  (6.384)
Manufacturing  2.765  -1.029  -16.531*  4.587  0.582
(2.398)  (2.774)  (10.168)  (4.846)  (4.066)
Services  4.264*  -0.110  -10.069*  -3.141  4.633
(2.338)  (2.646)  (6.097)  (4.682)  (3.808)
Firm Growth  -1.277  -2.023  -1.942  -6.420**  2.291
(1.487)  (1.600)  (4.348)  (3.000)  (2.372)
Small  -0.689  -1.575  -0.589  7.544**  4.823
(3.065)  (3.388)  (7.171)  (3.904)  (3.909)
Medium  -2.060  -0.001  0.429  -0.406  4.791
(2.033)  (2.309)  (5.837)  (4.016)  (3.211)
GDPpercapita  -0.192  -0.666"'  1.663*  -0.254  0.110
(0.171)  (0.188)  (1.081)  (0.271)  (0.268)
Inflation  -7.966*  -9.132*  46.5770  6.660  3.156
(5.044)  (6.071)  (25.915)  (9.447)  (7.219)
Growth  26.092  -74.822*  882.661***  -138.894**  -0.004
(34.324)  (38.857)  (290.950)  (61.602)  (49.250)
Privo  -1.552  4.286  -38.717*  2.171  6.939
(3.593)  (3.816)  (20.543)  (5.965)  (6.983)
Laworder  -0.996  2.330**  -1.116  1.803  -2.573*
(0.968)  (1.107)  (2.544)  (2.229)  (1.488)
Common  3.123  -3.327  14.814  -10.410*  -12.156**
(2.873)  (3.061)  (12.988)  (6.118)  (5.544)
Mcap  5.061
(7.596)
Lambda  -18.049**  -14906**"  43.737  48.458**  19.058
X2  210***  208***  199***  108***  157***
No of obs.  2963  2963  2402  2963  2963
'  "  "'  indicate significance  levels of 10,  5, and I percent respectively.
46Table V
Determinants of Financing Patterns: Firm Size
The estimated two-step  Heckman  model is (1) Access Financing Source= a+ P3i Government +  P3  2  Foreign +  03Exporter+  34Subsidized +  13sManuf. +  136Services+  P3 7Firm Growth+  18sSmall+13sMedium+  3  ,l
GDP per capita +  p3  i, Inflation+ P3  2  Growth + p3  3 Privo'Size + 3  14  Laworder'Size + 13  5  Common +  P3  16  Transition +  03  17  Financing Obstacle  *Size+ E. and (2) Financing Proportions=  a +  p  1  Government +  P 2
Foreign + P3Exporter+ P 4Subsidized +  03sManuf. + P36Sevices + P37FinnGrowth +  sSmall +  139Medium+  1 loGDPpercapita+  P3  Il  inflation+ P 12  Growth +  P 13  Privo + 14Laworder +  f15s  Common +  E.
Access  is a dummy variable  which takes the value  I for firms that use extemnal finance (or different financing  sources) and 0 for those who do not. Financing proportions are the propontion of investment financed
externally,  by equity, bank debt, operations financing or other sources.  External  finance is given by sum of bank, equity, operations and other finance.  Bank financing includes domestic and foreign bank financing.
Operations  is given by the sum of supplier credit and leasing.  Other sources include money lender, development  banks, public  sector and other financing.  Govermment and Foreign are dummy variables that take the
value I if the firm has government or foreign ownership,  respectively.  Exporter  is a dummy variable  that indicates if the firm  is an exporting  firm.  Subsidized is also a dummy  variable that indicates if the firm
receives subsidies from the national or local authorities.  Manufacturing  and Services are industry dummies. Fimn growth  is given by sales growth.  Size is a vector of dummy variables, Small,  Medium  and Large  that
indicate firmn size. They take  the value  I if a firm is small (or medium or large) and 0 otherwise. GDP per capita is real GDP per capita in US$.  Inflation is the log difference of the Consumer Price Index. Growth is
the growth  rate of GDP in USS.  Transition is a dummy variable for transition coumtries.  Privo is the financial  institutions' credit to the private sector divided by Gdp. Laworder  is an index  (1-6) that takes higher
values for legal  systems that are more developed.  Common is a dummy variable  that takes the value I for common  law countries and zero otherwise.  Mcap is stock market capitalization  divided by  GDP and is
included in the Equity Finance equations.  Financing obstacle is the general financing  obstacle as indicated in the WBES firm questionnaire.  They take values of I to 4, where I indicates  no obstacle and 4 indicates
major obstacle.  Only the rclevant coefficients  in the access equation are reported for brevity.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Access (extemal  finance)  Access( bank finance)  Access(equity  finance)  Access  (operational  Access (other finance)
finance)
Privo- small  -0.150  -0.180  -1.233"'  0.157  OA18"
(0.161)  (0.157)  (0.294)  (0.158)  (0.173)
Privo- medium  -0.281  .0.3990*  -0.356  -0.083  0.560*"
(0.174)  (0.163)  (0.275)  (0.165)  (0.178)
Privo- large  0.140  0.147  -0.387  0.009  0.486"
(0.227)  (0.204)  (0.309)  (0.197)  (0.210)
Laworder- small  0.052  0.038  0.057  -0.1 15"  -0.063
(0.051)  (0.051)  (0.076)  (0.052)  (0.058)
Laworder- medium  -0.001  -0.001  -0.064  -0.112**  -0.028
(0.047)  (0.043)  (0.063)  (0.056)  (0.049)
Laworder- large  -0.017  -0.061  -0.002  -0.089*  0.037







Common  0.082  0.210"  0.495"**  0.238**  -0.173
(0.114)  (0.103)  (0.124)  (0.101)  (0.116)
Financing Obst.- small  0.070''  0.049  -0.002  0.004  0.051
(0.035)  (0.037)  (0.049)  (0.037)  (0.041)
Finan. Obst. -medium  0.091"*  0.057*  0.077*  0.041  0.144"*
(0.036)  (0.034)  (0.047)  (0.034)  (0.039)
Financing  Obst. -large  0.215*"'  0.171"*  0.140"  0.187"*'  0.155"'
(0.057)  (0.051)  (0.067)  (0.051)  (0.055)
X7  116"*'  118*"*  168*'6  108*"*  124*A*
No of obs.  2963  2963  2402  2963  2963
', "*, "'  indicate  significance levels of 10, 5, and I percent respectively.
47Table VI
Determinants of Financing Patterns: Institutional Development and Access to External Finance
The estimated two-step Heckman model  is (1) Access  Financing Source = a + 30  Govenmment + 3  2 Foreign + P33  Exporter + P 4Subsidized +  13sManuf  +  P6 Services +  P3  7Firm  Growth +  13sSmall +  19 Medium +  3  lo
GDP per capita +  0 1  l Inflation+ p 12  Growth +  p  13  PfiVo*Size +  p 14  Laworder  Size + 3  is Common + 316  Transition +  r  17 Financing Obstacle *Size+  3  is Financing Obstacle *Size*Privo+  3  19  Financing Obstacle
*Size*Lawordcr+ E,  and (2) Financing Proportions=  c  + P3i  Government+  02 Foreign +  13 Exporter+ P4Subsidized +  p,Manuf. +  P6 Services +  03 7Fimn  Growth +  Oa Small+ -1Medium + p loGDP per capita +  03
,,  Inflation+ 13  12Growth +  p  13 Privo +  p ,4Laworder +  0 13,  Common +  C. Access is a dummy variable which  takes the value  I for fimis that use extemal finance (or different financing sources) and 0 for those who do
not.  Financing proportions are the proportion of investment financed  extemally, by equity, bank debt, operations financing or other sources.  External finance is given by sum of bank, equity, operations and other
finance.  Bank  financing includes domestic and  foreign bank financing.  Operations  is given by the sum of supplier credit and leasing.  Other sources include money lender, development banks, public sector and
other financing.  Govemment  and Foreign are dummy  variables that take the value  I if the firm  has govemment  or foreign ownership,  respectively.  Exporter is a dumnmy variable that indicates if the firm is an
exporting  firm.  Subsidized  is also a dummy variable that indicates  if the firm receives subsidies from the national or local authorities.  Manufacturing and Services are  industry dummies. Firm growth is given by
sales growth.  Size is a vector of size dummy variables,  Small, Medium and Large that indicate firm size. They take  the value  I ifa firm  is small (or medium or large) and 0 otherwise.  GDP per capita is real GDP per
capita in US$.  Inflation is the log difference  of  the Consumer Price  Index.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP in US$.  Transition  is  a dummy variable for transition countries.  Privo is the financial  institutions'  credit
to the private sector divided by Gdp.  Laworder is an index  (I-6) that takes higher values  for legal systems that are more developed.  Common is a dummy variable that takes the value  I for common law countries and
zero otherwise.  Mcap is stock market capitalization divided by  GDP and is included in the Equity Finance equations.  Financing obstaclc is the general financing  obstacle  as indicated in the WBES firm  questionnaire.
They take values  of I to 4, where  I indicates no obstacle and 4 indicates major obstacle.  Only the relevant coefficients in the access equations are reported for brevity. Detailed variable definitions and sources are
given in the appendix.
Access (extemal  Access( bank finance)  Access(equity finance)  Access (operations  Access (other
finance )  finance)  finance)
Financing Obst.- small  0.143  0.164  -0.305  -0.129  0.224
(0.160)  (0.165)  (0.246)  (0.166)  (0.190)
Finan. Obst.- medium  0.071  0.016  0.359*  0.043  0.029
(0.137)  (0.127)  (0.185)  (0.129)  (0.151)
Financing Obst.- large  0.202  0.177  -0.207  -0.117  -0.003
(0.205)  (0.178)  (0.232)  (0.171)  (0.188)
Financing Obst.- small *  privo  0.169*  0.250**  -0.040  -0.031  0.122
(0.110)  (0.111)  (0.140)  (0.111)  (0.124)
Finan. Obst.- medium  *privo  0.270+*  0.1720  0.225*  0.074  0.008
(0.118)  (0.109)  (0.146)  (0.111)  (0.122)
Financing Obst.- large'privo  0.554***  0.503***.  0.493***  -0.055  -0.068
(0.200)  (0.168)  (0.192)  (0.155)  (0.161)
Financing Obst.- small *laworder  -0.030  -0.047  0.067  0.033  -0.048
(0.038)  (0.039)  (0.055)  (0.039)  (0.045)
Finan. Obst.- medium *  laworder  -0.017  -0.005  -0.083*  -0.007  0.026
(0.033)  (0.031)  (0.043)  (0.031)  (0.037)
Financing  Obst.-  large  *laworder  -0.043  -0.047  0.027  0.082*  0.045
(0.050)  (0.044)  (0.056)  (0.043)  (0.046)
X  2  109***  1I***  170***  105***  120***
No of obs.  2963  2963  2402  2963  2963
*,  *', *+ indicate significance  levels of 10, 5, and I percent respectively.
48Table VII
Pecling Order
The estimated model is Pecking Order=- a +  13,  Govemment +  1  2  Foreign +  1  3  Exporter +  1 4 Subsidized +  1 sManuf. + 1  6 Services + 1  7  Fimn  Growth +  1  a
Small + 1,  9 Medium + 1  ,o  GDP per capita + 1  ,,  Inflation+ P , 2Growth +  1 13  Privo +  1 14  Laworder +  1  is Common +  p 16  Transition +  ,17  Financing Obstacle +
e. Pecking order is defined as bank or operations finance =0 or equity finance =1.  Finns which receive extemal finance only from other sources are eliminated.
Independent variables  are defined as in Table IV.  Regressions are estimated using Logit probability model. In columns 2 and 4 Privo, Laworder and Financing
obstacles are interacted with size dummies, small, medium and large.  In Columns 2 and 4  financial obstacles are interacted with Privo, also for different  sizes.
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  ',  **, **  indicate significance  levels of 10,  5, and I percent respectively
1  2  3  4
Govemment  0.147  0.226  0.150  0.251
(0.190)  (0.197)  (0.190)  (0.197)
Foreign  0.670***  0.693***  0.667**  0.694***
(0.148)  (0.150)  (0.149)  (0.151)
Exporter  0.039  0.038  0.032  0.027
(0.130)  (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.131)
Subsidized  0.070  0.042  0.064  0.033
(0.172)  (0.174)  (0.172)  (0.175)
Manufacturng  -0.437"  -0.439**  -0.433'  -0.428"*
(0.187)  (0.188)  (0.188)  (0.189)
Services  0.040  0.009  0.040  0.015
(0.175)  (0.176)  (0.175)  (0.177)
Fimn  Growth  0.208*  0.204**  0.204"  0.202*
(0.105)  (0.106)  (0.105)  (0.106)
Small  0.121  1.546  0.093  0.766
(0.181)  (0.865)  (0.182)  (0.951)
Medium  -0.117  1.097  -0.126  0.399
(0.160)  (0.779)  (0.160)  (0.866)
GDP per capita  0.079**  0.079'"  0.082***  0.084'*'
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)
Inflation  0.382  0.361  0.422  0.405
(0.368)  (0.370)  (0.369)  (0.371)
Growth  7.386**  7.558**  6.932"'  6.985**
(2.621)  (2.639)  (2.634)  (2.651)
Privo  -1.056***  -1.849***
(0.315)  (0.525)
Privo -small  -1.671***  -2.1420*
(0.404)  (0.801)
Privo -medium  -0.881**  -1.583**
(0.397)  (0.735)
Privo -large  -0.411  -2.689***
(0.435)  (0.940)
Laworder  -0.074  -0.070
(0.088)  (0.089)
Laworder -small  0.022  0.014
(0.134)  (0.135)
Laworder - medium  -0.168*  -0.174*
(0.108)  (0.108)
Laworder -large  0.014  0.036
(0.136)  (0.137)
Common  0.994***  1.023***  1.029***  1.101***
(0.211)  (0.213)  (0.212)  (0.215)
Transition  0.7690**  0.712**  0.769*0*  0.725*'
(0.189)  (0.192)  (0.189)  (0.193)
Financing Obstacle  -0.000  -0.110
(0.055)  (0.079)
Financing Obstacle  *Privo  0.279**
(0.145)
Financing Obstacle  -small  -0.179**  -0.231 *
(0.092)  (0.130)
Financing Obstacle -med  0.087  0.000
(0.083)  (0.120)
Financing Obstacle -large  0.159  -0.224
(0.120)  (0.184)
Financing Obstacle -small  .0.132
*Privo  (0.243)
Financing  Obstacle -med  0.238
*Privo  (0.237)
Financing Obstacle -large  0.868***
*Privo  (0.325)
LR Chi-Sq  175***  192***  179***  200***
No of obs.  1863  1863  1863  1863
49Table VIII
Pecking Order - Extensions
The estimated model  is Pecking Order- a +  p a Government +  0 2  Foreign +  0 3  Exporter + B  4Subsidized + 0 sManuf. + 0 6  Services + p 7Firm Growth +
sSmafl+  PMedium+  PaIGDPperCapita+  1 lInflation+ P 2Growth+pI3 Pivo+  1 4Laworder+  pas  Common+  P6 Tmnsition+p17 Financing
Obstacle +  a.  Pecking orderis defined as bank oroperations finance  O0  orequity finance  l.in Panel Abut as operations fnance=0, bank fnance=l, and
equity fhnance2 in Panel B. Finns which receive external finance only from other sources are eliminated.  Independent variables are defined as in Table
IV.  Pane  A regressions inchide four additional variables:  Concentration is bank eoncentration  ratio, state-owned is the proportion of banking system
owned by the state, corruption is the level of corruption in bank officials, and restrict is a measure of restrictions on bank activities.  Regressions  are
estimated using Logit probability model in Panel A and Ordered Logit model in Panel B. In columns 2 and 4 Privo, Laworder and Financing obstacles are
interacted with size dummies, small, medium and large.  In Columns 2 and 4 financial constraints are interacted  with Privo, also for different sizes.  For
brevity only the relevant coefficients are reported.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Panel  A  1  2  3  4
Concentration  -0.017"'  -0.017?*'  4.017***  -0.019***
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)
State-owned  0.010*  0.011'  0.010*  0.010*
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)
Corruption  0.090  0.087  0.089  0.085
(0.084)  (0.085)  (0.084)  (0.085)
Restrict  -0.158**  -0.163***  4.162*"  -0.168***
(0.056)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.058)
Privo  -0.934*"  -2.238***
(0.487)  (0.731)
Privo -small  -1.486***  -2.968***
(0.586)  (1.196)
Privo -medium  -0.580  -1.645*
(0.563)  (0.975)
Privo -large  -0.500  -3.029"**
(0.594)  (1.258)
Laworder  -0.332***  -0.333"*'
(0.129)  (0.130)
Laworder -small  -0.441"*  -0.457***
(0.193)  (0.195)
Laworder -medium  -0.347*"  -0.355*
(0.148)  (0.149)
Laworder -large  -0.257  -0.257
(0.179)  (0.181)
Common  1.671***  1.738"*'  1.711***  1.797**
(0.352)  (0.357)  (0.354)  (0.359)
Transition  0.970***  1.008**  0.982***  1.047
(0.313)  (0.320)  (0.317)  (0.325)
Financing Obstacle  -0.024  -0.196**
(0.072)  (0.100)
Financing Obstacle *Privo  0.475***
(0.193)
Financing Obstacle -small  4.281*"  -0.450***
(0.122)  - (0.169)
Financing Obstacle  -med  0.147  0.008
(0.106)  (0.149)
Financing Obstacle -large  0.063  -0.343
(0.152)  (0.231)
Financing Obstacle -siall  0.507
*'Privo  (0.351)
Financing Obstacle -med  0.408
*Privo  (0.308)
Financing Obstacle -large  0.964"*
*Privo  (0.426)
LRChi-Sq  130"*'  144*"'  136**  154"'
Noofobs.  1121  1121  1121  1121
*,"*,"  ***indicate significance  levels of 10, 5, and I percent respectively
50Panel  B  1  2  3  4
Privo  -0.682***  -1.574***
(0.237)  (0.427)
Privo -small  -1.196*"  -2.375'**
(0.314)  (0.694)
Privo -medium  -0.616**  -1.050*
(0.309)  (0.601)
Privo -large  -0.116  -2.236e**
(0.346)  (0.756)
Laworder  -0.055  -0.050
(0.066)  (0.067)
Laworder -small  0.063  0.063
(0.105)  (0.105)
Laworder -medium  -0.116*  -0.120*
(0.080)  (0.081)
Laworder -large  -0.039  -0.025
(0.096)  (0.096)
Common  0.699'**  0.720***  0.730***  0.778**
(0.177)  (0.178)  (0.177)  (0.179)
Transition  0.065  0.012  0.063  0.009
(0.148)  (0.150)  (0.148)  (0.151)
Financing Obstacle  -0.022  -0.1480*
(0.045)  (0.067)
Financing Obstacle *Privo  0.317*"
(0.126)
Financing Obstacle -small  -0.138'  -0.293**
(0.080)  (0.117)
Financing Obstacle  -med  0.035  -0.015
(0.067)  (0.100)
Financing Obstacle - large  0.055  -0.291 *
(0.089)  (0.143)
Financing Obstacle - small  0.378*
*Privo  (0.209)
Financing Obstacle -med  0.138
'Privo  (0.204)
Financing Obstacle - large  0.837***
*Privo  (0.275)
LRChi-Sq  127***  140*"  133**  153*
No of obs.  1863  1863  1863  1863
* *  ',  ** indicate significance  levels of 10, 5.  and I percent respectively
51Appendix Table Al
Number of Firms in Each Country












Costa Rica  49
Czech Republic  63
Geamany  31

































United States  32
Venezuela  41
52Appendix: Variables and Sources
Variable  Definition  Original source
GDP  GDP in current U.S. dollars, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators
GDP per capita  Real per capita GDP, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators
Inflation rate  Log difference of Consumer Price Index  International  Financial Statistics
(IFS), line 64
Privo  {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t)  + F(t-1)/P_e(t-l)]}/[GDP(t)/PLa(t)],  where  IFS
F is credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to the private sector (lines 22d + 42d), GDP is line
99b, P_e is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average
CPI for the year.
Laworder  Measure of the law and order tradition of a country.  It is an  International  Country Risk Guide
average  over 1995-97.  It ranges  from 6, strong law and order  (ICRG).
tradition, to  1,  weak law and order tradition.
Mcap  {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t)  + F(t-l)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_.a(t)],  where IFC and IFS
F is stock market capitalizaton, GDP is line 99b, P._e is end-of
period CPI (line 64) and P._a is the average CPI for the year
Common-Law dummy  Takes value one if origin of the legal system is British, and  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
one otherwise  Shleifer and Vishny, henceforth
LLSV (1999)
Transition  Dummy variable  that takes value one if country is a transition
economy, zero otherwise.
Concentration  The degree of concentration of deposits in the five largest  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)
banks
State-owned  fraction of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)
more govermnent owned
Restrict  measures regulations restricting banks from engaging in  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)
securities market activities,  insurance, real estate transactions
and owning nonfinancial firms.  This indicator ranges from 4
(least restricted) to 16 (most restricted).
Firm Growth  Estimate of the firm's sales growth over the past three years.  World Business Environment
Survey (WBES)
Government  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any  World Business Environment
government agency or state body has a financial stake in the  Survey (WBES)
ownership of the fim, zero otherwise.
Foreign  Dummy variable that takes  on the value one if any foreign  World Business Environment
company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership  Survey (WBES)
of the firm, zero otherwise.
Exporter  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports,  World Business Environment
zero otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
Subsidized  Dummy variable that takes on value one if firm receives  World Business Environment
subsidies (including tolerance of tax arrears) from local  or  Survey (WBES)
national  govemment
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the  World Business Environment
manufacturing industry, zero otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
Services  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the  World Business Environment
service industry, zero otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
53Agriculture  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in  World Business Environment
agriculture, zero otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
Construction  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if fu-rm is in  World Business Environment
construction,  zero otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
No. of competitors  Regarding your firm's major product line, how many  World Business Environment
competitors do you face in your market?  Survey (WBES)
Firm size  A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50  World Business Environment
employees,  medium size if  it has between 51  and 500  Survey (WBES)
employees and large if it has more than 500 employees.
Financing Constraint  How problematic  is financing for the operation and growth of World Business Environment
your business:  no obstacle  (1), a minor obstacle (2),  a  Survey (WBES)
moderate  obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Corruption  Corruption of bank officials- Is  the corruption of bank  World Business Environment
officials no obstacle (1),  a minor obstacle (2), a moderate  Survey (WBES)
obstacle  (3) or a major obstacle  (4)?
Equity  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year  World Business Environment
coming from equity, sale of stocks  Survey (WBES)
Bank finance  Share  (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year  World Business Environment
coming from local and foreign commercial  banks.  Survey (WBES)
Other finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year  World Business Environment
coming development banks, money lenders, public and other  Survey (WBES)
sources.
Operation finance  Share (percentage) of firm's  financing over the last year  World Business Environment
coming  from supplier credit and leasing arrangements  Survey (WBES)
External finance  Bank finance + Equity + Operation finance + other finance  World Business Environment
Survey (WBES)
Peck  A dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the firm uses bank  World Business Environment
or operations finance and I if  it also uses equity finance.  Survey (WBES)
Those firms that use only other finance are deleted.'
Peck2  A dummy variable that takes the value 0 if a firm uses only  World Business Environment
operations finance,  I if it also  uses bank finance, and 2 if  it  Survey (WBES)
also uses equity finance. Those firms that use only other
finance are deleted.
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